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PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COSTS OF CARE IN
PUBLIC MENTAL INSTITUTIONSt
DAVID W. MERNITZtt
Witch-burning is everywhere discountenanced. No one now believes
that mentally ill persons are insensitive to heat and cold. The exorcism
of demons has been replaced by the therapy of drugs. These are past
chapters in the treatment of the mentally ill.
Yet-despite the considerable progress made in the past two centuries
in attitudes toward and treatment of the mentally ill-in the important
area of allocating the costs of public institutional care, vestiges of ideas
which antedate the burning of witches remain. Of course, the village
idiot is no longer auctioned to the bidder undertaking to support him at
the least expense to the community; and to suggest that the minor chil-
dren of a mentally ill person be indentured to help offset the cost of his
care is unthinkable. But in many states, the determination and enforce-
ment of private responsibility for the costs of care in public mental in-
stitutions is grounded upon concepts of morality and family responsi-
bility reaching back to the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 and its ana-
logues in the American colonies. Reimbursement practices are steeped in
the tradition of paupers and almshouses.
A re-examination of the role of private responsibility in the light of
new knowledge of mental illness and new ideas about mental health is
long overdue. Even though concepts of social responsibility may be ex-
panding, the private obligation for the costs of care in public mental in-
stitutions is not an outworn and useless anachronism. A well-grounded
and fair state reimbursement program can make a genuine contribution
to the costly battle against mental illness. It is clear, however, that the
rationale for the imposition of private responsibility must be sought not
in the context of colonial American views of social responsibility but in
light of the present real requirements and best interests of the state, the
patient and the family.
t The author is grateful to Robert 3. Engleman of the Connecticut bar, whose
helpful suggestions and careful criticism have been invaluable in the preparation of this
paper. Thanks are due also to Professor Elias Clark of the Yale Law School for his
encouragement and advice; and to the reimbursement and mental health officials of
forty-five states without whose co-operation this study would have been impossible.
This article in no way represents the official views of the United States Department
of Justice.ft Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice.
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The problem of institutional costs, like most other matters which
touch upon questions of state finance and state services, is an immediate
one. More than ninety-five percent of all hospitalized mental patients in
the United States are in state mental hospitals.' The total state outlays
for maintaining and operating these hospital facilities have more than
tripled since 1948, while the average daily per patient expenditure has
risen approximately 150 percent.2 It is not surprising that mental hos-
pital expenses have become one of the several largest categories of state
expenditures.'
Proponents of intensive treatment centers, research projects, "half-
way houses" to bridge the gap between hospital and home, and other
recent mental health developments must face the question which the state
fiscal planner is sure to ask: Where is the money to come from? With
traditional sources of tax revenue now wholly inadequate to meet the
budgetary needs of the states, they must exercise their ingenuity to find
funds elsewhere. The burgeoning popularity of unclaimed property stat-
utes testifies to the attempts of many states to tap other non-tax sources
of revenue.4
It should be recognized that a state mental health program can never
become a self-sustaining enterprise. Each day discloses a further need
for new facilities, additional personnel, and greater research. Modern
mental health care, with its emphasis on treatment rather than custody,'
will become more expensive, not less so. Nevertheless, up-to-date pro-
cedures for the determination and enforcement of private responsibility
can greatly enhance attempts to secure substantial revenues from institu-
tionalized persons or their families. Furthermore, modernization of
these reimbursement procedures can minimize their often negative influ-
ence on establishment of a therapeutic milieu for the patient's recovery.
Not only, then, must the basic hypothesis of private responsibility
be evaluated in terms of today's knowledge of mental illness, but the pro-
1. Average daily resident-patient population, 1956: private hospitals, 14,505; public
hospitals, 554,157. BIoETRIcs BRANCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PATIENTS IN MENTAL IN-
STITUTIONS 1956, Part II (Public Hospitals for the Mentally Ill) Table 20, and Part I
(Private Hospitals for the Mentally Ill) Table 6 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 623,
1959) [Hereafter cited as PATIENTS IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS (1956)1.
2. INTERSTATE CLEARINGHOUSE ON MENTAL HEALTH, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS, STATE ACTION IN MENTAL HEALTH, 2 (1956-57).
3. In most states, the expenditures for the state hospital system are surpassed only
by those for schools, social welfare, and highways. See, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES, SECTION VII (1960-61).
4. See Note, Abandoned Chattels and Intangible Things As A Source of Revenue,
42 IOWA L. REv. 399 (1957).
5. See THE PATIENT AND THE MENTAL HOSPITAL, passim (Greenblatt et al., eds.,
1957).
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cedures which determine and impose this responsibility must also be re-
oriented so that they conform to an underlying philosophy. When this is
done, the imposition and enforcement of private responsibility for the
costs of care in public mental institutions can stand as an integral part
of a program which positively contributes to the mental health of the
community.
I. THE HISTORICAL HERITAGE
VII. And be it further enacted, That the father and grand-
father, and the mother and grandmother, and the children of
every poor, old, blind, lame, or impotent person, or other poor
person not able to work, being of sufficient ability, shall, at
their own charges, relieve and maintain every such poor person
in that manner, and according to that rate, as by the justices of
peace of that county where such sufficient persons dwell, or
the greater number of them, at their general quarter sessions
shall be assessed; upon pain that every one of them shall forfeit
twenty shillings for every month which they shall fail therein.
-43 Eliz. c. 2 (1601)
Perhaps the most prominent characteristic of the earliest provisions
for organized community aid to the indigent was that it was a last resort.
In England indiscriminate almsgiving by the monasteries and wealthy
overlords had not ameliorated poverty but encouraged it. Confronted
by the large number of paupers who sustained themselves in idleness by
wandering in search of alms, the English Parliament in the sixteenth
century enacted a series of statutes which, by imposing severe penalties
on the roving apprentice, servant or laborer, were intended to curtail this
vagrancy. In 1601 the Elizabethan Poor Law levied an annual exaction
for the support of the poor in each community. Eligibility for com-
munity aid, however, was contingent upon the complete exhaustion of
other possible means of support. The family of "sufficient ability" was
obliged to meet the needs of its indigent members upon penalty of a fine
for failure to do so.'
Whether the need arose from mental incapacity, physical handicap,
or mere indolence, the feeling that community support of the poor was
an extreme measure was, if anything, intensified by its transplant to
6. The development of the English poor law during this period is traced in 7
VEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1927); LEONARD, EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLISH
POOR RELIEF 67-94 (1900).
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colonial America.' The hardships of the new world were sufficient with-
out the burden of wilful poverty. Mere survival required the utmost in
mutual co-operation and effort. Each man benefited to the extent of the
common ability, and each had to toil in assistance of this common benefit.
A necessary corollary of this organization for survival was the
grouping of the whole community into family units. The child without
parents had to have a sponsor pledged to support him in case of need;
the servant was bound to his master by the rigorous terms of his inden-
ture, guaranteeing the servant's faithfulness in his duties and the mas-
ter's fidelity in supporting the servant.'
The fruits of family misfortune were in the first instance viewed as
a family responsibility. The incapacity of the family's chief provider
meant only that the children and wife had to carry a greater burden. Al-
though the lunacy of a wife or the birth of a defective child was recog-
nized as a matter of grave concern to the family, still community relief
was not to be expected; in an age which believed widely in demoniacal
possession, such embarrassments were best handled as unobtrusively as
possible. Rigid colonial religious orthodoxy preached that sympathy to-
ward those afflicted with mental illness or similar disabling handicaps
was not only unwarranted, but perhaps sinful. Burdens of handicapped
members of the community were viewed as the natural consequence of
judgment decreed by a stern God upon the wicked and innately inferior.
Mental illness was therefore keenly felt as a family disgrace.'
As has already been suggested, little distinction was drawn between
the mentally ill and other socially dependent persons. When a family
could no longer care for a mentally ill member, he was cared for (or
neglected) like any other member of that amorphous group called "pau-
pers." One persisting effect of this agglomeration has been that, despite
the subsequent separation of the mentally ill from other dependent classes,
7. The most convenient brief history of the American development is DEUTSCH,
THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1952) [Hereafter cited as DEUTSCH] ; another
useful history is ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY (Hall et al., eds., 1944)
[Hereafter cited as ONE HUNDRED YEARS]. Older works are GRIMES, INSTITUTIONAL
CARE OF MENTAL PATIENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1934); HURD, THE INSTITUTIONAL
CARE OF THE INSANE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (4 vols. 1916-17). In addition,
there are a number of studies of the development of public assistance and poor relief in in-
dividual states. See, e.g., KELSO, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC POOR RELIEF IN MASSACHUSETTS
1620-1920 (1922) ; CAPEN, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE POOR LAW OF CONNECTICUT
(1905); SCHNEIDER, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW YORK STATE 1609-1866(1938). BENTON, WARNING OUT IN NEW ENGLAND 1656-1817 (1911) is a fascinating
little book on one aspect of early American poor law. I have drawn freely from these
and other sources in outlining the development of the idea of private responsibility.
8. KELSo, op. cit. supra note 7, at 30.
9. See Shryock, The Beginnings: From Colonial Days to the Foundation of the
American Psychiatric Association, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS, at 5.
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the belief persists in many quarters that mentally ill persons cared for
outside the family are per se economically destitute. As will be seen, this
notion, among others, has had a crippling effect upon the reimbursement
programs of a number of states.
As population and urbanization increased, makeshift methods of
fulfilling primitive social welfare obligations were found wanting."0 They
began to give way in the face of a recognized need for greater centraliza-
tion and uniformity in the administration of social welfare. Of primary
significance was the rise of the almshouse or poorhouse as a focal point
for the gathering and maintenance of paupers. While the care these in-
stitutions afforded was probably only a scant improvement over that
formerly supplied, the building of such institutions represented a sub-
stantial step forward from the previously predominant attitudes of neg-
lect and indifference. Furthermore, upon payment of the very nominal
costs of care, the almshouse would accept those persons whose care cus-
tomarily had been a family responsibility. Thus, except for those men-
tally ill persons whose families could afford care in the few existing pri-
vate institutions, the responsibility for providing places of custody for
the mentally ill was largely assumed by local governments.
The almshouse was a combined penal institution, workhouse, and
hospital. The criminal and imbecile, prostitute and cripple, aged and in-
fant-all of society's outcasts-were mingled within its walls.
Gradually, however, the idea grew that perhaps poverty was not it-
self the illness, but only a symptom which many maladies shared. If this
were true, then indiscriminately to collect these pariahs in one place
might be wrong. Mental illness, for example, this awakening sophistica-
tion said, was perhaps an ailment which could be treated and cured rather
than the divine judgment of a just God.
This novel idea gained further acceptance around the beginning of
the seventeenth century, largely because of the success of the so-called
"moral treatment" of the mentally ill in France and England. Prior to
that time the belief prevailed that none, or very few, of the mentally ill
actually could be cured. Moral treatment contradicted this belief, resting
as it did on the premise that mentally ill persons were nonetheless persons
and might improve if they were treated as such. 1
10. DEUTSCH, 186-87.
11. The basic tenets of moral treatment, according to a contemporary view, were
these:
A system of humane vigilance is adopted. Coercion by blows, stripes and chains
is now justly laid aside. The rules most proper to be observed are the following:
Convince the lunatics that the power of the physician and keeper is absolute;
have humane attendants, who shall act as servants to them; never threaten but
execute; offer no indignities to them, as they have a high sense of honour; punish
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To facilitate this treatment, its advocates prevailed upon the legisla-
tures in a number of states to appropriate funds for the erection of sepa-
rate institutions for the mentally ill. Between 1824 and 1844, Georgia,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Ohio, South Carolina, and Tennessee had opened separate mental hospi-
tals and Virginia its second."
Not only was the former pessimism regarding the treatment of the
mentally ill discarded, but in its wake came a "curability craze." The
new mental institutions, each trying to surpass the others, made compet-
ing claims for the efficacy of their respective "cures."' 3  More signifi-
cantly, they instilled in the public a belief in curability which gave even
greater impetus to the expanding movement for erection of hospitals for
the insane with state funds.
Unfortunately, the building of these institutions did little to alleviate
the plight of the dependent insane, who for the most part remained in
almshouses. Since the costs of maintenance in these asylums, when not
paid by the incompetent's family, continued to be borne by the local com-
munity, the attitude of local officials was dictated by financial considera-
tions. Even though provision was made for admission of the indigent
insane to the new mental institutions at very low rates, economy-minded
local poor-law officials were disinclined to increase expenses-in some
community almshouses as low as twenty-five cents per person per week-
by sending their dependent insane to the mental hospitals. Nor was this
parsimony confined to the poor-law officials. An 1827 New York law'"
required relatives of sufficient ability to reimburse the overseer of the
poor for support costs of persons maintained in an asylum; however, if
these relatives themselves provided "a suitable place of custody" and
there maintained the lunatic, he could not be removed from their care.
Some persons took advantage of this latter provision by confining their
disobedience peremptorily in the presence of the other maniacs; if unruly, forbid
them the company of others, use the strait waistcoat, confine them in a dark and
quiet room, order spare diet . . . ; tolerate noisy ejaculations; . . . let their
fears and resentments be soothed without unnecessary opposition; adopt a system
of regularity; make them rise, take exercise and food at stated times.
BECK, AN INAUGURAL DISSERTATION ON INSANITY 27-28 (1811), quoted in DEUTSCH, 92.
12. The first separate institution for the mentally ill was opened in 1773 in Williams-
burg, Virginia. Hamilton, The History of American Mental Hospitals in ONE HUNDRED
YEARS at 73.
13. These claims offer an interesting example of the manipulation of statistics to
the best possible advantage. For example, the percentage of cures was based on the
total number of patients discharged during the year and new admissions were completely
ignored. Moreover, it appears that in a number of instances, patients were reported as
cured a number of times. The most flagrant example is that of a woman who was
reported "cured" forty-six times before her death-in the asylum. DEUTSCH, 149-56.
14. New York Laws 1827 cl. 294 at 318-19.
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unfortunate kindred in attics, pens or cages to save the costs of mainte-
nance in a public institution. 5
The expansion, both geographically and numerically, of industrial
and commercial society during the mid-nineteenth century rendered local
communities more and more inadequate to cope with advancing welfare
needs. Local treasuries were extended to the limit. The supposition that
public welfare services could be founded upon the cornerstone of local
responsibility was no longer supportable. To an ever greater extent, the
state became involved in the financing of charitable institutions.
The states' grudging assumption of responsibility for public welfare
services, especially provision for the mentally ill, was transformed into
an accepted duty largely through the efforts of a single dedicated cru-
sader, Dorothea Dix. Appalled by the treatment of the mentally ill in
local almshouses and asylums, Miss Dix devoted herself to urging ac-
ceptance of her belief that persons afflicted with mental illness were en-
titled to care and treatment in mental hospitals financed and adminis-
tered by the state. Glowing with the righteousness of her cause, Miss
Dix was extremely persuasive. To her influence may be directly attri-
buted the erection of new mental institutions in a number of states, and
countless improvements in already existing ones. Most importantly, how-
ever, she convinced a number of states that the local obligation theory of
support for the indigent insane was obsolete."
The New York State Care Act of 1890" was perhaps the first state
law unequivocally to adopt the principles which Miss Dix had been urg-
ing. It declared that as soon as they could be accommodated, all the in-
sane then in almshouses should be transferred to state asylums and there-
after be supported wholly by the state. During the late nineteenth cen-
tury other states had enacted into law the principle of state care in vary-
ing degrees; and with the New York act as a prime example, more states
15. DEUTScH, 421.
16. Miss DLx was not unaware that the assumption of this responsibility by the
states would place a heavy burden upon their treasuries. She therefore urged Congress
to pass a bill giving federal lands to the states, who in turn were to use the proceeds
from their sale to improve the condition of the mentally ill. Her original proposal
involved only five million acres. When it was defeated, she modified the proposal
upward and returned to do battle anew. When her "12,225,000 Acre Bill" finally passed
both houses of Congress in 1854, it was vetoed by President Franklin Pierce, who
maintained that under the Constitution the federal government had no right to dispense
charity. DEUTSCH, 158. For a more charitable view of Pierce's veto-that his real fear
was land speculation-see NIcHOLs, FRA IN PIERCE 349 (1931). In spite of this
setback, the effectiveness of Miss Dix's crusade can be measured by the fact that by
1880, at about the time of her retirement, the United States boasted some seventy-
odd public mental institutions as well as many private ones. Hamilton, op. cit. supra
note 12 at 153-159.
17. New York Laws 1890 ch. 126 at 303.
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soon followed the lead. Thus, shortly after the turn of the century, the
principle that the state should provide facilities and funds for the care of
the mentally ill was widely accepted.' 8
Notwithstanding this radical shift of the obligation to support the
indigent insane from the local government to the state, the responsibility
of families of sufficient ability to pay the costs of care of their institu-
tionalized kin remained unchanged. 9 The old poor-law provisions im-
posing the obligation to support the needy upon relatives of sufficient
means were broadened where necessary to make them specifically ap-
plicable to the institutional support obligation. This transmutation was
made without any apparent recognition that new factors existing in the
area of mental illness and the mental institution might dictate different
patterns of private responsibility and different agencies for its enforce-
ment. As with their poor-law counterparts, these statutes were either
ignored or nullified by lax enforcement. Apparently it was assumed that
the small revenues which might be realized through their enforcement
would be more than offset by the costs of collection. With some excep-
tions, this is the prevailing situation in the United States today.
II. STATE PROCEDURES FOR THE DETERMINATION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY
A. Persons Liable
Currently, liability for at least a portion of the costs of care in state
mental institutions is imposed upon the patient and members of his fam-
ily unit, variously defined, in virtually every one of the United States.
In five states-Arizona," New Mexico,2 South Carolina,2" South Da-
kota,23and Georgia'---statutory liability is limited to the estate of the
patient. Prior to 1959 Georgia uniquely extended free institutional care
to those committed to its single state mental hospital; and despite the new
liability imposed on the patient's estate by a 1959 law, difficulties in its
18. A few states, it should be noted, adopted what has been called the Wisconsin
or county-care system. Under this plan, whose chief advocate was Wisconsin, each
county provides its own institutional facilities for mental patients, with the state some-
times contributing toward the support of indigent patients. It has been suggested that
the county-care system was not adopted by conscious choice, but rather was forced
upon some states by overcrowding in the few state facilities that were originally pro-
vided. DEUTScH, 261-69. Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska, and New Jersey still adhere to
some form of the county-care system.
19. The responsibility of families of sufficient ability likewise remained the same
when the county rather than the state, provided the institutional facilities.
20. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-503, -520 (Supp. 1960).
21. N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-21 (1953).
22. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-950.23, -950.25 (Supp. 1960).
23. S.D. CODE § 30.0605-1, -2 (Supp. 1960).
24. GA. CODE ANN. § 35-1106 (Supp. 1959).
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interpretation have so far precluded enforcement.2 5 Each of the forty-
five remaining states, either by specific statutory provisions governing
the institutional support obligation or by reference to other general statu-
tory support provisions imposes additional liability upon various other
family members. -" This liability is joint and several in some states, 7
while in others varying sequences have been established for its imposi-
tion."8 Typically, the obligation is extended to spouses, parents and chil-
dren. However, at least nine states place the duty to contribute toward
institutional support on less closely related members of the family, in-
cluding grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters.2"
25. Letters to author from the Chairman of the House Sub-committee on Eleemo-
synary Institutions of the Georgia Legislature, June 20, 1959; and the Assistant Business
Administrator of the Milledgeville State Hospital, June 1959.
26. ALA. CODE tit. 45 §§ 257, 262 (1959) ; ALASKA Coup. LAWS ANN. § 51-4-20bb
(Supp. 1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-115, -230 (1947); CAL. WE.LFAPE AND INST'NS
CODE § 6650; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-10-7, 71-1-6, 71-1-15 (1953); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 17-295, -298 (1960) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5127 (1953), tit. 16 § 5505, tit. 31,
§ 2831 (Supp. 1960), tit. 13, § 501 (Supp. 1960) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.21(6) (1959) ;
HAWAII REv. LAWS § 330-22 (Supp. 1957); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-354 (Supp. 1959) ;
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 912, § 9-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 22-401a,
-401d (Burns Supp. 1960); IoWA CODE ANN. § 230.15 (Supp. 1960) ; KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-2006 (Supp. 1959); Ky. Rrv. STAT. § 203.080 (1955) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
28:143 (1951), LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 119, 227 (1952) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 25,
§ 294, ch. 27, § 139 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 4, 5 (Supp. 1960); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 123, § 96 (Supp. 1960); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.811 (Supp. 1957); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 246.51 (Supp. 1960); MIss. CODE ANN. § 6909-13, § 7357 (1952) ; Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 202.260 (1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 38-214 (Supp. 1959), §§ 71-233,
-235 (1953); NFn. REv. STAT. § 83-352.02 (1958); NEv. REV. STAT. § 433.370 (1957);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8:41 (1955) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-66 (Supp. 1960); N.Y.
MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 24(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-117 (Supp. 1959);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 25-02-08 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5121.06 (Page
Supp. 1960); OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 111, 115 (1954); ORE. Rv. STAT. §§
426.240(2), 179.620 (1959 Repl.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1361 (Supp. 1960); tit. 71,
§ 1783 (1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 26-3-17, 40-8-13 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 33-629 (Supp. 1960), § 33-630 (1955); TEX. RFv. Civ. STAT. art. 3196a (1952);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-6 (1961); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2684 (1959); VA. CODE
ANN. § 37-125.1 (Supp. 1960); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.02.230 (Supp. 1957) ; W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 2672 (Supp. 1960) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.10 (1957) ; Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 25-30 (1959).
In the absence of any statutory provisions providing for reimbursement for support
expenditures, the state's right to claim it has been denied, on the ground that support
was intended and understood as an act of charity. Wiseman v. State, 94 S.W.2d 265
(Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
27. E.g., CAL. WELFARE AND INST'NS CODE § 6650; NEV. REv. STAT. § 433.370
(1957); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.811 (Supp. 1959); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §
24(2); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 179.620(2), .630, .690 (1959).
28. E.g., ALASKA Coup. LAWS ANN. § 51-4-20bb (Supp. 1958) (spouse, parents,
adult children); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-10-8 (1953) (children, parents, brothers
and sisters, grandchildren, grandparents) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31 §§ 2830, 2831 (Supp.
1960) (State Welfare Home; inmate's estate, husband's property, parents, grandparents,
children, grandchildren); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-629 (Supp. 1960) (father, mother,
brothers, husband, children) ; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 46.10(3) (1957) (husband, wife, father,
mother).
29. Arkansas: father, mother, children, grandchildren. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-115
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It is not surprising that the statutory language employed in those
states which extend liability to more remote relatives often amounts to
little more than a paraphrase of early American private responsibility
laws and the Elizabethan Poor Law upon which they were patterned.
Although the old language remains intact, enforcement practices recog-
nize the changes the past century has brought in the cohesiveness of the
family and the economic interdependence of its members. Regardless of
the scope of statutory liability, primary enforcement activity is charac-
teristically directed against the estate of the patient, his spouse, parents
and children, normally in that sequence."° Any extension of liability
beyond this area multiplies the difficulties of enforcement to a degree
where the return to be expected does not warrant the effort involved.
Thus, enforcement against grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and
sisters is the very infrequent exception to the general rule."'
B. Amount and Duration of Liability
1. The Maximum Charge. With several exceptions, the maximum
statutory charge-assessed against those responsible for the costs of
supporting a state mental patient to the extent they can pay-is based up-
on and limited to the per capita cost-what some states somewhat mis-
(1947); Colorado: father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, child or grandchild,
brother or sister. COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-10-7 (1953); while this is a general
support statute, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-15 (1953) imposes the institutional sup-
port obligation on "persons liable by law." Delaware: parents, grandparents, children,
grandchildren. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 2831 (Supp. 1960). This provision applies
only to the support of those in the state welfare home for the indigent and chronically
ill. As to those in the state mental hospital, the scope of the support obligation is not so
broad. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5127 (1953) and tit. 13, § 501 (a) (Supp. 1960);
Maine: husband, wife, father, mother, grandparent, child or grandchild. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 25, § 294 (1954) ; Michigan: patient, husband, wife, father, mother, grandfather,
grandmother and children. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.811 (Supp. 1959); Mississippi:
father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brothers and sisters. Miss. CODE ANN. §
7357 (1952). While this is also a general support statute, Miss. CODE ANN. § 6909-13
(1952) imposes the institutional support obligation upon "any person legally bound
to support." New Jersey: father and grandfather, mother and grandmother, children
and grandchildren, husband and wife. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-66 (Supp. 1960) ; Rhode
Island: father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, children, grandchildren. R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 40-8-13 (1956). This is also a general support statute; but R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. § 26-3-17 (1956) imposes the institutional support obligation upon "persons liable
for maintenance." Tennessee: father, mother, brother, sister, wife, husband, children.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-629 (Supp. 1960).
30. A state which carries on only moderately active collection efforts may confine
its attempts to secure reimbursement to claims against the estate of the patient, either
living or deceased, and against the decedents' estates of others who are secondarily liable.
See Rushfelt, Liability for Support of Patients in State Hospitals, 26 KAN. STATE B.A.J.
409, 420 (1958).
31. The author has not found a single reported case involving attempts to enforce
the institutional support obligation against these more distantly related persons. While
this does not demonstrate that informal attempts to enforce liability are not undertaken,
it does indicate that this enforcement stops short of formal legal action.
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leadingly call "actual cost."32  This statutory maximum, however, ap-
plies only to private responsibility. When the county is initially liable for
the costs of care of its residents, the county's maximum cost is far below
the private per capita figure and ranges from five to twelve dollars per
month.3 3
It should be noted that while some statutes set the reimbursement
rate in terms of "actual cost," they do not mean the cost to the hospital
of caring for a particular patient. Rather, the term "actual cost" in
these statutes, like the more common "per capita" formulation, means the
aggregate cost to the hospital of caring for all patients, divided equally
among them; in other words, the average per patient cost." Thus, a
patient receiving expensive drug therapy, shock treatments and psychi-
atric interviews can be charged no more than a chronic patient requiring
nothing more than custodial care.
This equalization of the costs of care in state mental hospitals is in-
dicative of an attitude which is in sharp contrast with that prevailing
toward general hospitals. Both general hospitals and the public-at-large
32. In New Jersey and New York, the statutory language permits the maximum
charge to be set at a rate higher than per capita cost. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-67 (1940) ;
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 24(1). In Minnesota, while the patient himself can be
charged the per capita maximum, the liability of relatives is limited to ten percent of
this amount. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 246.51 (Supp. 1960).
In a few other states, a dollar maximum-which, if recently revised, probably
reflects per capita cost-is specified by statute or regulation. IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-401a
(Burns Supp. 1960) (ten dollars per week) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-352 (Supp. 1959)
(four dollars per day) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 37.125-15 (Supp. 1960) (sixty-five dollars per
month) ; Ill. Mental Health Reg. No. 53, authorized by ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 913/, § 9-21
(Smith-Hurd 1956) (eighty-one dollars per month) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 35-1106 (Supp.
1959) (three dollars per day).
The average per patient per diem cost in public hospitals for the mentally ill in
1958-59 was $4.32. CouNcI. OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 1960-61, 351.
33. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.863(5) (Supp. 1959) (six dollars per month); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 246.54 (Supp. 1960) ; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 25-02-08 (1960) (forty-
five dollars per month) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-614 (1955) (two hundred dollars per
year).
This discrepancy makes it theoretically possible for counties in some states to make
a profit on patients they send to the state mental institution, since they may be able
to seek reimbursement from liable persons at the private rate. Compare N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 25-02-08 (1960) with MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 246.53, 246.54 (Supp. 1960).
34. The fact that many of the statutes which speak in terms of "actual cost" re-
quire these costs to be computed on the basis of expenditures for the previous year
clearly indicates that in these cases actual cost is intended to be synonymous with per
capita cost. E.g., ALASKA COMP. STAT. ANN. § 514-20bb (Supp. 1958); MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 123, § 96 (Supp. 1960); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.02.410 (1951); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-118 (1958). Compare the language of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5127(b):
The State Board of Trustees of the Hospital shall keep an account of the cost
of the care, maintenance and support furnished each patient while in the Hospital
and shall credit against the account all monies received from the patient or
from any other person on behalf of the patient.
It is somewhat difficult to see how this statute can be interpreted as establishing or
authorizing a per capita rate.
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anticipate that each patient will pay for the care which he is given; and to
a large degree this expectation is well-grounded. The many varieties of
hospitalization and group insurance now available have made it possible
even for those at lower income levels to bear a large proportion of the
costs of their necessary hospital care. 5 On the other hand, the apparent
hypothesis of state mental hospital care, another legacy of its historical
development, is that the patient will be unable to pay more than a nominal
charge. Since most of the funds will come from the state, it has never
been thought necessary to develop the more sophisticated per-patient ac-
counting found in the general hospital. Indeed, in some states the equali-
zation of mental hospital costs is carried even further by fixing the maxi-
mum charge at the average per capita cost of all state institutions of a
similar kind.3"
The obvious difference, in these circumstances, between a maximum
charge derived from institutional per capita cost and one based upon an
average of institutional per capita costs will be especially marked when
the more costly of the specialized institutions, such as those maintained
for the training and education of retarded children, are concerned. 7
2. The Means Test. The significance of these variations in the
maximum charge, and of the statutory maximum itself, is diminished by
the fact that only a small proportion of the patients in state mental insti-
tutions are able to pay the maximum amount chargeable. 8 Far more
important than the ceiling placed upon private responsibility is the floor.
Without exception, this minimum is determined through application of
35. In 1958, sixty per cent of the costs of hospital care was paid for by health
insurance. Williams, Developing Role of Health Insurance, 13 J. Am. Soc. CLU 212,
216 (1959).
36. Thus, the per capita cost computation may be an average of the costs at state
custodial institutions, intensive treatment centers, institutions for the mentally deficient,
and institutions for alcoholics, among others. Cf. CAL. WELFARE AND INST'N CODE
§ 6651; OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5121.03 (Page Supp. 1960); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 91Y2,
§ 9-20 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960).
37. In Connecticut, for example, the per capita cost for children at certain of the
state training centers for retarded children is four or five times as much as the per
capita cost at the state mental institutions. Interview with Assistant to the Commissioner
of Mental Health, Connecticut Department of Mental Health, December 29, 1959.
The Ohio statute minimizes the cost differentials arising from the kind of care an
institution gives by classifying mental institutions into four groups-receiving hospitals
for the mentally ill, state hospitals for the mentally ill, state schools and institutes for the
mentally deficient, and state institutions of psychiatry-and providing for averaging
only within each group. Oao REv. CODE ANN. § 5121.03 (Page Supp. 1960).
38. Illinois, which carries on a vigorous reimbursement program, during fiscal
1958 billed at the maximum rate only about nine per cent of the total patient population.
Department of Public Welfare, State of Illinois, Statistical Information Relating to the
Reimbursement Service (4-22-59). While other states, whose ability-to-pay formulae
are less sophisticated than Illinois', may bill a larger percentage of their patient popu-
lations at maximum, this fact does not indicate that more than nine or ten per cent of
the total patient population is, in fact, able to pay the maximum rate.
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the means test, which involves simply an ascertainment of ability to pay."
Under the general formula that the patient and his family should pay no
more of the statutory maximum than they can afford, the maximum
charge is adjusted to a figure which those responsible can reasonably be
expected to provide. Provision is usually made for a redetermination of
the amount of liability on the basis of altered circumstances."
Because of its elusive character, application of the ability-to-pay
standard is subject to considerable manipulation, not infrequently result-
ing in unfairness and favoritism. Most statutes imposing private re-
sponsibility lack any standard of determination at all other than the bare
direction that charges be assessed in accordance with ability to pay. If
this determination is left to a centralized administrative agency, then of
necessity that agency will develop some uniform criteria. When, how-
ever, a state gives the committing court or a local board the responsibility
for determining ability to pay, cases tend to be handled on an ad hoc ba-
sis, with the locality's social philosophy often as important to decision as
the responsible family's finances.
The relatively few statutory formulae for arriving at ability to pay
vary from simple tests considering only assets, current income, and a few
current obligations4 ' to Connecticut's more complex formulation:
. . . in determining ability to pay, in each case the welfare
commissioner shall consider, among other items, the following
expenses and obligations: Special employment expenses; edu-
cation expenses of the children of the patient or relative; medi-
cal and hospital obligations, if being liquidated; shelter ex-
penses in excess of one-fourth of the gross income of the liable
person, minus federal income tax and any mandatory retirement
deductions; accrued and unpaid obligations under a court order;
debts currently being liquidated if contracted prior to the date
of admission of the patient or contracted involuntarily subse-
quent to such date; and the number and condition of others
39. In at least one state, no provision is made for adjustment of the maximum
charge. IOWA CODE ANN. § 230.15 (Supp. 1960) :
Mentally ill persons and persons legally liable for their support shall remain
liable for the support of such mentally ill. . . . The county auditor . . . shall
enforce the obligation herein created as to all sums advanced by the county.
(Emphasis added.)
40. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 45 § 263 (1959); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-1105 (Supp.
1959) (requires an annual redetermination) ; MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, § 5 (Supp. 1960);
NEV. Rrv. STAT. §§ 433.410(4), (5) (1957).
41. E.g., Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-520(A) (Supp. 1960) (assets); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 179.610(3) (1959 Repl.) (current living expenses and other reasonable necessary
obligations) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2651 (1959) (income of the person committed
and earnings of the husband or wife and minor children.)
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dependent upon him, and shall also consider any payments
which may become due and payable to the patient or the pa-
tient's estate by reason of any social security, workmen's com-
pensation, Veteran's Administration or other like benefits or
from any policy of insurance covering such patient.42
Besides directing consideration of such factors as these, a few states also
make explicit the necessity of preserving a cushion of assets against the
patient's eventual release to avoid his becoming a charge upon the state."3
3. Accrual of Charges. Though application of the means test gen-
erally allows responsible parties to pay for the patient's support at a rate
less than the statutory maximum, a number of states provide that the dif-
ference between this adjusted rate and the maximum charge shall accrue
as a debt collectible from the estate of the patient and, in some cases,
from the estate of any liable relative.44 If the patient leaves no depend-
ents, there is no injustice in allowing a claim against his estate; re-
imbursement of the institution which cares for the patient during his life
should be preferred over the claims of legatees or intestate successors, to
whom any distribution is likely to be a windfall. On the other hand,
when a patient leaves dependents or when the claim for accrued charges
is asserted against a deceased relative's estate, the choice is not so clear.
Depriving a dependent of an inheritance may shift his dependency to the
state, costing the state more in the long run than any amount it may
realize by pressing collection; and the imposition of the institutional sup-
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-295 (1960).
43. This protective cushion is specified in some states and ranges from $300 in
Vermont to $500 in Massachusetts. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2661 (1959) ; MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 123, § 96 (Supp. 1960). Compare Wyo. STAT. AN. § 25-14 (1959). If com-
mitted person is single, widow or widower without dependents, cushion of $3,000 is
allowed; if married, or a widow or widower with dependents, the cushion is $5,000.
Elsewhere, the amount of the cushion is left to the discretion of the enforcement agency
or enforcing court. The Illinois regulations relating to this problem quite sensibly tie
determination of the cushion to the age of the patient and the amount of his income
from social security and retirement benefits. See note 105 i'nfra. Of course, if no hope
exists for the patient's eventual release, the necessity for a cushion vanishes. California,
for example, provides that a medical certificate stating that the patient is suffering
from a "chronic form of insanity" and that, in the opinion of the certifying physician,
"will, in all probability, continue to be a charge in a State hospital until death," will
release the cushion and allow its application to maintenance costs. CAL. WELFARE AND
INST'NS CODE § 6655.
44. CAL. WELFARE AND INST'NS CODE § 5077 (county has a claim for all funds
expended for institutional care of a mentally deficient person); CoLo. REv. STAT. §
71-1-16 (1953) (estate of patient liable for full per capita cost) ; ILL. STAT. ANN.
ch. 9132, § 9-24 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); IOWA CODE ANN. § 230.30 (1949); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 59, § 5(e) (Supp. 1960) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 246.53 (Supp. 1960) ;
NEv. R1v. STAT. §§ 433.410(3), .480 (1957); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 24(1);
ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 179.620(3), .740(4) (1959 Repl.) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2680
(1959). These accrued claims against the estate may also be given priority over certain
other debts of the estate. See statutes cited in note 79 infra.
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port obligation on others than the immediate family no longer comports
with present social realities. The considerable discretion normally vested
in the official empowered to make such claims probably softens the ab-
solute statutory language in these circumstances. It is likely that those
charged with enforcing the statute err more on the side of foreswearing
just claims than in pressing claims which would result in hardship."
Furthermore, the size of accrued claims is often reduced by statutes of
limitation,"0 although it should be noted that in some states these statutes
are made specifically inapplicable to claims for institutional support
costs.
4 7
4. The Duration of Liability. In prescribing the charge for insti-
tutional care, a few states, besides taking into account personal resources
through the means test, consider the period of time for which the family's
liability for support will continue. In many cases of mental illness, a
family may reasonably expect that its institutionalized member will
shortly return to productive economic activity, and further progress in
the treatment of mental illness makes the expectation of early release in-
creasingly stronger. In some tragic cases, however, as with a seriously
defective infant, hope for anything but life-long institutionalization is
probably unwarranted. The protection and care afforded such a person
in an institution often results in an almost normal life span. When this
is the case, to require the family to contribute perpetually to the patient's
support may result in a financial drain interfering with the lives of the
family's normal members. Lack of financial resources may prevent a
brother of the defective from obtaining an adequate education; it may
discourage from marriage a sister who feels an obligation to aid her
aging parents.
45. While no specific authority can be cited in support of this conclusion, in light
of the general disfavor with which many state officials view the institutional support
obligation it seems a reasonable inference.
46. E.g., CAL,. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 345 (4 years); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-295 (1960)
incorporating CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-576 (1960) (6 years) ; NEv. REV. STAT. § 433.480
(1958) (estate of patient discovered within five years of his death liable for maintenance
charges); N.Y. MENTAL HyGiENE LAW § 24(6) (6 years); cause of action does not
accrue until patient for whose care action is brought has died or been discharged);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 115 (1954) (suit must be instituted if charges are not
paid within ninety days of due date) ; S.C. CODE LAWS § 32-950.25 (Supp. 1960) (no
action to enforce lien of assistance may be brought more than one year after patient's
death; but compare S.C. Mental Hosp. v. May, 226 S.C. 108, 83 S.E.2d 713 (1954)
where it was held that the 6 year statute of limitations did not apply to actions for
maintenance.) VA. CODE ANN. § 37-125.1 (Supp. 1960) (no recovery of amounts more
than five years past due) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.10(11) (1957).
47. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.605 (6) (Supp. 1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
143-122, -125 (1958) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2681 (1959); WASH. Rxv. CODE ANN,
§ 71.02.360 (1951) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 203.110 (1953) (statute of limitations does not
run against recovery until after acquisition of an estate.)
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To avoid, or at least to mitigate, such socially undesirable results,
Connecticut, Maryland, and Montana have limited the duration of the
statutory support obligation.48
C. Patterns of Organization and Procedure for Determination
and Enforcement
Any determination of the amount and incidence of liability or any
decision to enforce liability is, of course, a matter of individual judg-
ment. Even when the most complex and exact statutory formula guides
the imposition of private responsibility, the effectiveness of the reim-
bursement program ultimately depends upon the capabilities of its ad-
ministrators and the character and scope of the limitations placed upon
them by the organizational setting in which they operate. Where co-
ordination and control are poor or entirely lacking, administrative deci-
sions often exhibit wide variations. For these reasons, the functional
structure of the states' reimbursement programs is at least as significant
as the substantive rules which the programs seek to effectuate.
Generally speaking, existing patterns of administrative organization
fall into three categories-local, institutional and central-according to
the level at which the primary activity leading to collection of institutional
support costs takes place. These classifications, however, are not neces-
sarily exclusive. Occasionally the structure of a state program may com-
bine the characteristics of one or more categories.
1. Local responsibility. In consonance with the early tradition of
local community concern for the mentally ill, slightly less than one-half
of the states provide that the determination of the support obligation, as
well as its enforcement, should take place at the local level.49 The agency
48. The Connecticut statute, the most recent pronouncement by a state, wholly
relieves liable relatives of the costs of support after sixteen years or upon the patient's
majority, whichever occurs later. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-295 (1960). The Maryland
and Montana statutes reduce the maximum rate chargeable to the family of an institu-
tionalized person after a specified period. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 5(a) (Supp. 1960)
(after thirty months the rate chargeable to the family of the patient not to exceed
twenty-five per cent of the per capita cost) ; MONT. REV. CODE/,ANN. §§ 38-214, -411
(Supp. 1959) (three dollars per day for first ninety days, two dollars per day thereafter).
49. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 45, § 259 (1959); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-520 (Supp.
1960) ; CAL. WELFARE AND INST'NS CODE § 5260 (applies only to the support obligation
for the mentally deficient) ; HAWAII REV. LAWS § 330-22 (Supp. 1957) (upon complaint
of institutional superintendent) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 25, § 294 (1954) (any court
of competent jurisdiction on petition of commissioner of health and welfare), ch. 27,
§ 135 (1954); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.817 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.863 (Supp.
1960) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 38-214, -410 (Supp. 1959) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-60
(Supp. 1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 179.640(2) (1959 Repl.) (court determines only if
state board of control is unable to determine financial ability "to its satisfaction."). PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 1363 (Supp. 1960) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8-14 (1956) (on petition
of state director of social welfare) ; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.02.230 (1959 Repl.)
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 25-14 (1959).
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which carries the greatest responsibility in this type of organization is the
local probate court or county baseline court. In the usual situation the
court determines ability to pay in conjunction with its duties as the com-
mitting agency, and it retains jurisdiction to enforce its decision. In a
few instances, especially when the county itself is primarily liable for
support of residents in state institutions, the county welfare board or a
similar agency may make the initial determination, relying on the court
in contested cases or if enforcement by formal action becomes necessary."0
The judicial inquiry into the financial status of the patient and
responsible relatives formerly often took place in the very hearing to de-
termine sanity. This practice was almost universally condemned by both
lawyers and psychiatrists."' At best, application of the means test is an
enforced inquiry into personal affairs which the individual would keep
to himself if he were free to do so; when it is incorporated into a pro-
cedure often resembling a criminal jury trial, it becomes all the more
distasteful. 2 Today, with some exceptions, 3 a committing court given
the duty of making the means-determination conducts separate proceed-
ings for that purpose.
In the typical situation, as soon as the mentally ill person has been
admitted to the institution, the court designates some person or agency,
usually the county welfare department or county attorney, to conduct an
investigation into the financial status of the patient and, if it appears
likely that he will be unable to pay in full, to determine whether there are
any relatives who may be liable for his support costs." The investigat-
ing agency may require a guardian and any responsible relative to furnish
full financial information."5 This information is then reported to the
Although strictly speaking, determinations in the following states are made at the
institutional level, the information upon which these determinations are made is col-
lected by the court or its designated agency; this total dependence upon information
supplied by local officials has prompted their characterization as "local" rather than
"institutional" states. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-15 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. §
35-1104 (Supp. 1959); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2003 (Supp. 1957) ; NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 433.380 (1957) ; N. Max. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-21 (1953) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-6
(1961) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2654 (1959).
50. NE. REv. STAT. § 83-352 (1958) ; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 25-08-26 (1960).
51. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMIENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 4, COMMITMENT
PROCEDUaES (1958) ; Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill, 50 MICH. L. REv. 837,
852 (1952); Overholzer, The Desiderata of Central Administrative Control of State
Mental Hospitals, 96 Am. J. PSYCH. 517, 526-27 (1939).
52. See generally, Ross, Commitments of the Mentally Ill, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 945
(1959). For a comparison with commitment procedures in other countries, see Patterson,
Hospitalization Procedures for the Mentally Ill in the U.S.S.R. and Other European
Countries, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 111 (1960).
53. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2662, 2663 (1959).
54. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 45, § 258 (1959) ; ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-520(A)
(Supp. 1960) ; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 38-214(1) (Supp. 1957).
55. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 45, § 258 (1959).
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court, which may either issue an order to those named by the investiga-
tors to show cause why a support decree should not be entered against
them or may make its decision on the basis of the report alone." If the
former course is followed, or if a timely request is made by some in-
terested party, a full hearing will ensue, with the introduction of evidence,
including the investigative report, on the issue of the respondents' ability
to pay." In either case the normal avenues of judicial review are open to
any person aggrieved by the support order."s A copy of the final order is
sent to the institution, which bills the patient or responsible relatives at
the ordered rate." A default in payment is treated as a violation of the
court's decree and subjects the violator to punishment for contempt.
2. Institutional responsibility. As previously indicated, in many in-
stances in which the institution is nominally responsible for deciding up-
on whom and to what extent the support obligation is to be imposed, it
must rely upon information supplied by a committing court or some
other local investigating agency.6" Sometimes, however, the full respon-
sibility for making the investigation is left with the institutional business
manager or department of collections.6 In these cases considerable re-
liance must be placed upon the data which is obtained through admission
interviews and questionnaires sent to the patient's guardian or family.
Although it may be possible to verify the information supplied in these
questionnaires through a check of local property tax rolls and state in-
come tax returns, if the existence or whereabouts of children or other
responsible persons is not disclosed by the questionnaire, the likelihood
that any obligation will ever be imposed upon these absent persons is in-
deed remote.
When responsible persons found by the business manager to be able
to pay at a certain rate refuse to contribute, the institution must seek the
56. E.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.817 (1956); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 38-214(3)
(Supp. 1959); ORE. REv. STAT. § 179.640(3) (1959 Repl.); R.I. GEN. LAws § 40-8-15
(1956).
57. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.863 (Supp. 1960); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §
38.214(2), (3) (Supp. 1959) ; WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.02.230 (1959 Repl.).
58. E.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 179.640(5) (1959 Repl.).
59. In a common variation of this pattern, the financial information collected by
the court or local investigating agency is forwarded to the institution, which attempts
to use this information as the basis of a voluntary agreement with responsible persons.
Only when this effort fails is a judicial declaration of the obligation necessary. See
note 49, supra.
60. See note 59, supra.
61. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-230 (1947) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-354 (Supp. 1959) ;
Miss. CODE ANN. § 6909-13 (1952) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 143.119, 143.120 (1958) ;
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:144 (1951) (allows state hospitals department to adopt pro-
cedures; procedures adopted by state department of hospitals provide that admitting
hospital makes determination).
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assistance of the state legal officer or one of his local assistants to en-
force the obligation. Even when the reluctance of these officials to in-
stitute suits of this kind can be overcome, the court may refuse to grant
judgment for the accrued charges without proof that the institutional
determination as to the amount of the assessment is in fact in accord with
the responsible person's ability to pay; and on this question the views of
the court and the institution may diverge.
3. Centralized responsibility. The states' increasing assumption of
responsibility for providing facilities for the care of the mentally ill in
their expanding populations has prompted the recognition, as it did at
an earlier time in our history, that centralized agencies are necessary to
maintain adequate and efficient control over total state programs. Those
states which are the largest from the standpoint both of population and
of number of public institutions have generally led the way in establishing
centralized departments of control within which are located the reimburse-
ment agencies.12
The common facts of centralization and state-wide responsibility,
however, do not eliminate the diversities arising from the kind of central
department in which reimbursement and collection activities are placed.
Centralized reimbursement agencies are variously situated within a de-
partment charged with the oversight of all public institutions, as, for ex-
ample, a department of institutions ;" within a state department of reve-
nue," and within a department of mental health or department of
welfare."2
62. California, New York, Illinois and Ohio, for example.
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5127, 5129, 5325, 5505 (1953) (state board of
trustees) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.21 (1960) (board of commissioners of state institu-
tions) ; N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 8:39 (1955) (department of administration and control
in division of investigation of accounts makes recommendations to institutional boards
of trustees).
64. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.817 (1956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 1365, 1366
(1954) ; cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2677-2680 (1959) (auditor).
65. ALASKcA ComP. LAWS ANN. § 51-4-20bb (Supp. 1958) (Department of Health);
CAL. WELFARE AND INST'NS CODE § 6653 (Department of Mental Hygiene-mentally ill;
see note 49 supra) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-295 (1960) (Comm'r of Welfare) ; ILL. STAT.
ANN. ch. 91Y2, § 9-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960) (Reimbursement Service, Department
of Public Welfare); IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-401 (e) (Burns Supp. 1960) (Division of
Mental Health, Department of Health) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 203.100 (1960) (Department
of Mental Health) ; MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, § 5 (Supp. 1960) (Department of Mental
Hygiene); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 96 (Supp. 1960) (Department of Mental
Health); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 246.51 (Supp. 1960) (Commissioner of Public Welfare);
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 24(1) (Commissioner of Mental Hygiene); OHIO Rv.
CODE ANN. § 5121.04 (Page 1954) (Bureau of Support, Department of Mental Hygiene
and Correction) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 112 (1954) (Director of Mental Health) ;
VA. CODE ANN. § 37-125.4 (Supp. 1960) (Reimbursement Division, Department of
Mental Hygiene and Hospitals) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2672 (Supp. 1958) (Director of
Mental Health); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.10(3) (1957) (Bureau of Collections and
Deportations, Department of Public Welfare).
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Again, the basic attitude of the state toward mental illness and the
mentally ill is often betrayed by which of these schemes of centralization
it has chosen. The tradition of custodial care for the insane, rather than
of intensive treatment for the mentally ill, probably explains why many
states have placed the control of mental institutions, and of correspond-
ing reimbursement activities, within a department of institutions and not
in a department of health. The state mental hospital has long been
viewed as the place where "crazy people are kept"; under this view the
mental hospital deserves no different treatment from the state peniten-
tiary, in which other aberrant individuals are confined. Thus, despite the
fact that the treatment function of a mental hospital is today more signifi-
cant than its role as a place of custody, the states conferring authority on
an agency generally supervising all institutions have entrusted the plan-
ning and execution of enforcement policies to a board lacking sufficient,
if any, psychiatric or medical expertise."8
Similarly, states viewing contributions made for the support of in-
stitutionalized persons as nothing more than a matter for the department
of revenue completely ignore the context of mental illness which gave rise
to the obligation. Family-hospital-patient interrelationships have been
recognized as having fundamental therapeutic importance in the treat-
ment of the mentally ill. 7 From this perspective, it becomes obvious that
the imposing of private responsibility from a primarily fiscal standpoint
can seriously hamper effective treatment. While any centralized agency
is perhaps a step forward in the administration of private responsibility
programs, only agencies operating within the state's department of health
or within a separate department of mental health are properly situated
for preparing and executing a well-integrated reimbursement effort.
Beyond these diversities inherent in departmental location, many
other differences can be found in the duties and powers of the central
agencies. Some states have purposely employed general language in their
responsibility statutes and have invested the governing agency with ex-
tensive rule-making power to define more precisely applicable criteria."8
66. One recent writer has argued that, in providing nothing more than custodial
care for institutionalized mental patients, states are in effect depriving these persons
of their liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
He argues that the concept of due process should include the right of an institutionalized
person to have adequate medical and psychiatric treatment of his mental illness. Birn-
baum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Compare Comment, 56 YALE
L.J. 1178 at 1203 (1947).
67. See Lidz et al., Patient-Family-Hospital Interrelationships in THE PATIENT AND
THE MENTAL HOSPITAL 535 (Greenblatt et al. eds. 1957); Preston, The New Public
Psychiatry, 31 MENTAL HYGIENE 177 (1947).
68. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91'%, § 9-21 (Smith-Hurd 1956):
The Department [of Public Welfare] is authorized . . . to make determina-
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To gather the financial information which is the raw material of the
means test determination, some central agencies employ field workers
who secure necessary information by interviews in the homes of liable
persons.6" Others, lacking sufficient funds or personnel to make inde-
pendent investigations of financial standing, rely more heavily upon data
secured through questionnaires,"0 which they may verify through com-
parison with state income tax returns or through the use of private
credit investigating firms. 1
In some states, while the central agency makes the necessary investi-
gations and determinations, the actual billing of responsible persons is
handled by each institution. 12  Other central state agencies are responsible
for both initial determinations and subsequent billing and collection.73
Very few agencies have been given legal staffs authorized to carry
enforcement to the ultimate conclusion of court proceedings.7" Usually
tions of the ability . . . to pay . . . and for such purposes to set a standard
as a basis of judgment of ability to pay, which standard shall be recomputed
periodically to reflect changes in the cost of living and other pertinent factors,
and to make provisions for unusual and exceptional circumstances in the
application of such standard.
The provision was upheld in the face of a massive attack on its constitutionality, in-
cluding an argument of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, in Kough v.
Hoehler, 413 Ill. 409, 109 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
69. This is the practice of the Connecticut Department of Public Welfare, for
example, as well as that of the Bureau of Support of the Ohio Department of Mental
Hygiene and Correction. Letters to author from assistant to the Commissioner of
Mental Health, Connecticut Department of Mental Health, December 29, 1959; and
from Chief of Division of Administration, Ohio Department of Mental Hygiene and
Correction, June 19, 1959.
70. Virtually all the centralized agencies have a standard form for tabulation of
relevant facts relating to financial ability. The interviews by field workers only
supplement this information.
Virginia enforces the disclosure-by-questionnaire requirement by imposing a five
dollar fine after sixty days for each week or part thereof during which a completed
financial statement is overdue. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-125.15 (Supp. 1960).
71. Indiana, for example, uses a private credit investigating agency to verify
financial reports submitted by relatives. Letter to author from Indiana Commissioner
of Mental Health, June 15, 1959. The legal division of the Kansas Board of Social
Welfare employs attorneys on a part-time basis to gather and verify financial informa-
tion. Rushfelt, Liability for Support of Patients in State Hospitals, 26 KAX. ST. B.A.J.
409, 418 n.61 (1958).
72. Ohio, for one, presently follows this arrangement. Letter to author from
Chief of Division of Business Administration, Ohio Department of Mental Hygiene
and Correction, June 19, 1959.
73. The Illinois Reimbursement Service, for one, handles both. Letter to author
from Deputy Director, Reimbursement Service, Illinois Department of Public Welfare,
June 16, 1959. A central agency is also occasionally given other duties not strictly
related to its reimbursement functions. For example, both the Wisconsin Bureau of
Collections and Deportations and the Illinois Department of Public Welfare, Reimburse-
ment Service are responsible for making arrangements for deporting to their home
states mentally ill residents requiring hospitalization.
74. The Legal Division of the Board for Texas State Hospitals and Special Schools
is the only one of which the author is aware.
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the agencies must rely upon action by either the state attorney-general or
one of his local district attorneys.7 5  To a degree this dependence sub-
jects the centralized form of administration to the same sort of difficul-
ties which attend local enforcement of locally or institutionally deter-
mined obligations. However, the continuing out-of-court pressure which
a central agency with continuity of concern can put upon a responsible
guardian or relative makes the need for enforcement by legal action
comparatively infrequent. By the same token, when such action does be-
come necessary, a central agency can often bring effective pressure on
a local official reluctant to perform his duty.
4. Enforcement sanctions. Irrespective of the level at which re-
imbursement activity occurs, special procedures are often available to aid
the enforcement of private responsibility. The prime weapon of the en-
forcement arsenal is, of course, court action-usually in the probate or
baseline court of the county where the patient or responsible person re-
sides. Enforcement may take the form of a simple action to enforce the
statutory support obligation or, if the court has made the initial deter-
mination of liability, of a proceeding for contempt of the court's order.
But an action predicated directly on the obligation set forth in the statute
is not always the sole method of enforcing private contribution. In
some instances, before receiving a voluntary patient, a state mental insti-
tution may require the execution of a bond or a contract binding a rela-
tive or guardian for payment of the costs of support." Besides having
the salutary effect (for the enforcing agency) of concluding the neces-
sity of a financial investigation, obtaining a contract or bond may help
to overcome the reluctance of local officials to bring enforcement pro-
ceedings, since in cases of default suit may be brought on an instrument
which, on its face at least, suggests an obligation voluntarily incurred.
Furthermore, such a contractual arrangement may avoid the often diffi-
cult problem of proving to an enforcing court that a charge assessed
against a patient or liable relative comports with his ability to pay; it may
also circumvent the force of some case law which requires that ability to
pay be shown for each period in which a charge is made, when statutory
75. The Arkansas arrangement is unique in that the Arkansas Hospital Board is
given specific statutory authorization to employ a private collection agency under a
contingent fee arrangement. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-230.1 (Supp. 1959).
76. TENN. CoDu- ANN. § 33-616 (Supp. 1960) (requires execution of a contract to
support plus a five hundred dollar bond) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 6906 (1952) (yearly rate
payable in advance plus fifteen hundred dollar bond) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.12 (Supp.
1960) (bond required in discretion of commissioners of state institutions); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 202.863(2) (Supp. 1960) (bond required in discretion of institutional business
manager).
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actions are brought encompassing long periods of delinquency.77
Because of the unpleasantness often associated with inquiries into
personal finances, reimbursement agencies are perhaps warranted in en-
couraging the making of voluntary contracts. Care must be exercised,
however, to insure that the obligation assumed by the liable party is not
out of proportion to his real ability to pay. Under the stress of the situa-
tion it is entirely possible that a responsible relative can be induced to
sign a burdensome contract. In such circumstances, enforcement of the
contract tends to engender the same difficulties as enforcement of statu-
tory responsibility and the advantages to be gained by the voluntary ar-
rangement are lost.
78
Of course, once a judgment for charges is obtained, the usual
methods of enforcing judgments are available. In addition to those
remedies normally associated with a suit for debt, however, the enforc-
ing agency often commands several supplementary procedures in aid of
collection. An agency may be authorized to seek a court order requiring
the patient's guardian to liquidate some or all of the property in his
charge so that arrearages can be satisfied and future installments can be
paid as they fall due."0 A Michigan statute renders voidable as against
the state certain transfers without consideration made by persons liable
for institutional support costs, in a provision not unlike the fraudulent
transfer provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Act."0 And a common
77. E.g., State v. Stone, 271 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
78. It is not inconceivable that a court would refuse to enforce such a contract
on grounds of duress or public policy, much in the same way that some courts have
rejected certain onerous terms in mass standardized contracts, as for example, in-
surance policies. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. Rav. 629 (1943).
79. CAL. WELFARE AND INSVNS CODE § 6655; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-355 (Supp.
1959); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 5(d) (Supp. 1960); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.817
(1956); NEv. REv. STAT. § 433.400(2) (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-627 (1955);
V1. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2657 (1959). Such statutory authorizations allowing institu-
tional or state creditors to seek a court order subjecting a patient's property to the
payment of support costs should be distinguished from other statutory provisions which
e.x proprio vigore give the state a lien on a patient's property for payments in arrears.
E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 230.25 (Supp. 1960) (giving a lien of assistance on real estate
owned by the committed person or his spouse); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-80.1 (Supp.
1960) (lien against property of inmates or persons chargeable with support) ; S.C. CODE
ANN. § 32-950.25 (Supp. 1960) (lien on real and personal property of any person
receiving treatment).
While a court may properly refuse a petition for liquidation brought under the
former provisions, especially if the property in question has a potential value far in excess
of its present value, when a lien for arrears is sought to be foreclosed, under normal
circumstances the court has no discretion to refuse liquidation, except insofar as the
amount of the "cushion" may be left to the court's discretion.
80. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.817 (1956). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 107.
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statutory term gives the state or county a preferred claim against the
estate of a deceased patient."'
D. The Success of Collection Activities
On a nationwide basis, collections from all persons liable for insti-
tutional support costs probably do not exceed ten percent of the total
costs of providing such support. While the proportion is as much as
twenty-five percent or better in a few states, this return is more than
balanced by the experience in other states, which, despite very similar
statutory maxima, realize as little as one percent on their outlay.82 That
the efficacy of reimbursement activities is largely responsible for these
disappointing figures is beyond question. Probably less than thirty per-
cent of the total charges billed against patients or liable relatives is ulti-
mately collected; and, it must be remembered, in a large number of cases
the first step, ascertainment of liable relatives, is never undertaken. Even
on the assumption that an active and effective reimbursement program in
every state would raise the nation-wide collection average only ten per-
cent, the additional revenues available to the states for their mental health
programs would amount to an estimated sixty-five million dollars.8 3
Although the percentage of over-all costs recovered by the states is
roughly comparable whether determination and enforcement procedures
are local or central in character, the proportion of paying patients is by
far greater in those states which have a centralized reimbursement pro-
gram. 4 The general non-success of the centralized states, despite more
81. E.g., ALASKA ComfP. LAWS ANN. § 51-4-20bb (c) (Supp. 1958) ; CAL. WELFARE
AND INST'NS CODE § 6651; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911/, § 9-24 (Smith-Hurd (Supp. 1960) ;
MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, § 5(e) (Supp. 1960) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 246.53 (Supp. 1960) ;
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-352.02 (1958 Reissue); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433.480(1)
(1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-126 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 179.620(3), .740
(1959 Rep.) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 32.950.23 (Supp. 1960).
82. These estimates are based upon data found in SUMMARY OF COLLECTION Ac-
TIVITIES IN THE 48 STATES FOR CARE GIVEN MENTAL PATIENTS, compiled in 1955 by the
Bureau of Collections and Deportations of the Wisconsin Department of Public Welfare.
The difficulty in obtaining complete information on collection activity should be noted.
The Biometrics Branch of the National Institute of Mental Health, United States De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare discontinued in 1955 the publishing of data
on the number of paying patients and the amount paid in full or in part for their care
in state mental hospitals, because of the inadequacy of the reporting of these items.
Letter to author from Chief of Hospitals Studies Section, Biometrics Branch, January
14, 1960.
83. The total maintenance expenditures in public mental hospitals in the United
States in 1956 were approximately $656 millions. PATIENTS IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS
1956, Part II, Public Hospitals for the Mentally Ill, Table 19, p. 69. An increase in
collection success from the present estimated ten per cent of total costs to twenty per
cent would raise revenues from an estimated $65.5 million to $131 million.
84. HOSPITAL STUDIES SECTION, BIOMETRICs BRANCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PATIENTS IN
MENTAL INSTITUTIONS 1954, Part II, Public Hospitals for the Mentally III, Table 21,
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active programs, to offset a higher proportion of their total costs sug-
gests that collections in these states tend to be regular and small, while
those in the local enforcement states are sporadic and occur primarily
when the amounts involved are considerable, warranting the effort and
expenditure necessary to enforce the claim.8" But the apparent anomaly
also may be partially attributed to variations from state to state in the
general economic level of families sending members to state institutions."
Despite the increasing costs of hospital care, a number of states
have retained the maximum charges set when costs were much lower,
apparently in the belief that comparatively low charges make collections
easier and result in greater returns than if the full cost of institutional
care were charged.8" But a 1950 study found that those states having
moderate maximum rates of reimbursement (under thirty dollars per
month) tended to be less successful in their collection activities than those
states which set higher maximums (above sixty dollars).s
It is questionable whether the level of the maximum charge has any
real effect upon the success of collection activity. The greater success
of states with higher maximums may be explained, at least in part, by the
fact that an upward adjustment of the maximum rate has often coincided
with a state's re-examination of the role of private responsibility-a re-
view which has usually led to more effective and vigorous reimburse-
ment machinery. On the other hand, a low maximum charge may have
a significant adverse effect upon the total amount of a state's collections.
As has already been noted, when the maximum charge is pegged at actual
cost, this figure has very little limiting effect upon the amount of contri-
butions, since application of the ability to pay formula usually requires a
downward adjustment of individual reimbursement rates. When, how-
ever, the maximum rate is considerably less than actual cost, this figure
does limit the amount of collections from those whose ability to pay is at
a rate above the low maximum but not equal to actual cost. Since a low
maximum rate probably does not facilitate collections, the fact that sev-
eral states retain such maximums can be explained either by their adop-
tion of a conscious policy of assuming almost all the costs of caring for
p. 56 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 523, 1957). Although this information is quite
incomplete and now somewhat out of date, the indicated pattern nonetheless clearly
emerges.
85. See, e.g., Directors of Insane Asylum v. Boyd, 37 N. Mex. 36, 17 P.2d 358
(1932) (claim for nearly $4,000 after person admitted to asylum as an indigent had
received a large inheritance).
86. See HOLLINGSHEAD AND REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1958).
87. See note 32, supra.
88. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS OF THE 48
STATES 121-22 (1950).
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the institutionalized mentally ill or, what is more likely, their continuing
belief that most mentally ill persons and their families will be able to pay
nothing more than a nominal charge anyway. Whether or not this latter
notion is openly expressed, its continuing influence upon both the sub-
stance and operation of state reimbursement programs cannot be ignored.
E. The Disposition of Collected Funds
Because of budgeting difficulties resulting from the uncertainties
of collection, monies collected from patients and other liable persons are
usually returned to the general fund of the state, the legislature appro-
priating the full amount required for institutional operation. Thus, pay-
ments in discharge of the private support obligation normally lose all
identification with the institution caring for the patient or even with
mental health in general.
Recently, a few states have enacted legislation dedicating some or all
of the revenues derived from this source to the state mental health pro-
gram, particularly for use in the areas of training and research. 9 Not
only is the special character of these monies preserved in this way, but
through knowledge and skills gained from the additional training and
research the state can more effectively care for its mentally ill-an as-
pect of the plan which may well make it less expensive to the state in the
long run than if all revenues were applied to offset operating expenses."
Moreover, legislation specially dedicating these funds presents a po-
tentially effective political approach for the advocates of expanded men-
tal health research and training. The building of mental hospitals, where
the bricks and mortar evidence the legislature's interest in mental health,
will always appeal more to legislative sensibilities than a program of
training and research, the results of which are generally less tangible.9
Lawmakers may be much more willing to embark upon the latter type of
program when they are presented with a means whereby such a program
can be financed with little or no appropriation from the general tax
revenues for that purpose.
89. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91V2, § 9-20 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); OHIO REP. CODE
ANN. § 5121.03 (Page Supp. 1960); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:663.1 (Supp. 1960);
cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-401b (Burns Supp. 1960) (all funds collected to be deposited
in a "mental institutions building fund"). For a summary of research activities gen-
erally, see COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, TRAINING AND RESEARCH IN STATE MENTAL
HEALTH PROGRAMS (1953).
90. See TRAINING AND RESEARCH, op. cit. supra note 89 at 204.
91. Compare GINSBERG, A PATTERN FOR HOSPITAL CARE, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW
YORK STATE HOSPITAL STUDY 233 (1949).
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III. TOWARD A MODERN STATE REIMBURSEMNENT PROGRAM
A. Can Private Responsibility Be Justified?
Present-day social theory has progressed somewhat beyond the Spen-
cerian viewpoint of C. R. Henderson, a prominent sociologist, who wrote
in 1893 that "state aid [for dependent classes] interferes with the whole-
some efforts of nature to weed out the inferior and incompetent in the
struggle for existence."12  The principle that caring for the mentally ill
is a common obligation is today too firmly established to be questioned.
The extent of society's obligation in this respect, however, is a mat-
ter of some controversy still. Those espousing widely divergent political
philosophies will agree that one prominent aspect of American political
and social development has been the increasing devolution upon govern-
ment of the responsibility for providing facilities and services whose
provision was formerly wholly a matter of private concern. Education
is an early example; recreational facilities, unemployment insurance, and
social security are more recent ones. These state services and facilities are
open for the most part, not only to those who cannot afford to provide
the same things for themselves privately, but also to those who can. And,
through the medium of taxation, all citizens support these services rough-
ly in accordance with ability to pay, irrespective of the extent of their
individual use. The proponents of complete governmental responsibility
for mental hospital costs would carry this principle of broadbased sup-
port over to the area of mental health."3
To consider the implications of this position from the point of view
of a political philosopher or social theorist is not the purpose of this
examination. Certainly, its worth or ill-logic is not illuminated by such
epithets as "socialism" or "welfare state." The objections to the prin-
ciple of private responsibility are in many instances intensely practical
ones and can be profitably examined as such.
The major criticisms made by those who favor complete government
subsidization are three: first, that collections made through enforcement
procedures do not warrant the expenditures for that purpose; second,
that enforcement of the institutional support obligation scarcely ever
results in a rich relative supporting his poor kin, but rather requires
those who have very little to contribute to the support of others who have
even less; and finally, that enforcement of the support obligation against
92. HENDERSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF DEPENDENT, DEFECTIVE, AND
DELINOUENT CLASSES 36 (1893).
93. For a statement recognizing the trend toward shifting responsibility for men-
tal health care from the family and local communities to "larger units of society," see
TRAINING AND RESEARCH, opr. cit. supra note 89 at 204.
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an unwilling relative often creates a breach in family relationships at a
time when it is most important to draw the family closer together. 4
The most significant fact to be noted is that none of these objec-
tions is really directed against the basic principle of reimbursement;
rather, each is a criticism of the way in which the reimbursement ma-
chinery operates.
While those who favor continuation and even expansion of private
responsibility raise a number of philosophical and theoretical arguments
to buttress their position, the most compelling reason for private support
is simply that most states cannot afford to neglect a possible source of
non-tax revenue. The state suffers a double loss during the period in
which a mentally ill person is institutionalized: the cost of his care falls
heavily upon the state, and his loss of earning capacity not only affects
tax revenues, but may also require governmental support for his de-
pendents." To say that this financial burden can be offset by increasing
general tax rates overlooks the fact that most states have reached, or at
least believe they have reached, the saturation point in raising revenues
by this means. Whether or not private responsibility laws reinforce
community judgments as to the desirability of intra-family responsi-
bility, then, it is abundantly clear that without additional sources of rev-
enue many states will be unable to continue existing mental health pro-
grams and certainly will be unable to institute new ones. Until and un-
less some radical revolution occurs in state financing, the continuation
of the principle of private responsibility can be justified on the same
basis as the special tax on gasoline, used for highway construction and
maintenance, that those who receive the primary benefits from the fa-
cilities should bear the primary burden of paying for them.
Moreover, it is demonstrable that the increased administrative costs
which may result from the establishment of an effective reimbursement
program are more than offset by the additional revenues realized. In
Illinois, for example, support collections increased from approximately
$1,500,000 in 1952 to $7,100,000 in 1958, while the administrative costs
remained constant at between six and seven percent of collections.9"
94. Cf. PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS COmmITTEE, NATIONAL Ass'N FOR RETARDED CHIL-
DREN, RESPONSIBILITY FOR COSTS OF MAINTENANCE AND TRAINING IN PUBLIC INSTI-
TUTIONS FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED (1958). For similar arguments in the context
of public (non-institutional) assistance, see ABBOTT, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, AMERICAN
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 164-69 (1949); LEYENDECKER, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 216-18 (1955).
95. For a full analysis of the costs of mental illness, see FEIN, EcoNol aIcs OF
MENTAL ILLNESS (1958).
96. Illinois Department of Public Welfare, Statistical Information Pertaining
to the Reimbursement Service (April 22, 1959).
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The justification of the private support obligation reaches beyond
the question of financial necessity. Enlightened application of the prin-
ciple of private responsibility may constitute a potentially effective instru-
ment in achieving the difficult goal of reshaping community attitudes to-
ward the mentally ill. The earlier belief that mental illness was a mani-
festation of divine punishment brought about by moral defects is not
altogether rejected today. Even where more progressive thinking pre-
vails, obloquy still is frequently directed toward families in which mental
disorders occur; and the patient's relatives themselves often experience a
sense of guilt arising from concern over their possible responsibility in
the patient's illness. 7 Indeed, underlying the beliefs of those who advo-
cate the abolition of private responsibility may well be a general charitable
intent to attenuate the family's identification with its mentally ill mem-
ber by interposing the impersonal agency of a benevolent government.
When group responsibility is substituted for individual responsibility in
this way, the likelihood of critical re-examination of individual attitudes
considerably diminishes.
Conversely, the operation of private responsibility programs neces-
sarily requires that some individuals face squarely the problem of mental
illness as it affects them. Even as the principle of private responsibility
is presently formulated in the statutes, in the rough terms of "per capita
cost," the theoretical premise is that payment is required for the actual
care and treatment received by the one who is ill. This approach tends to
undercut popular stigmatization of mental illness by viewing the care of
mental patients as not very different from the treatment of, say, persons
suffering from appendicitis. Further modernization of the statutes to
make the basic support charge better conform to the theoretical premise
of actual cost should fortify this view. The extent to which this and
other considerations should be taken into account in shaping the private
responsibility principle is the subject of succeeding sections.
B. The Scope of Liability
1. Upon whom shoidd the support burden fall? Legal liability for
institutional support costs ought to be limited to the patient, his spouse,
parents and children. As has already been suggested,9" limiting legal
liability to the patient, his spouse, and his first degree lineals merely puts
the statutory language in line with generally existing enforcement prac-
tices and thereby explicitly acknowledges the changes that have occurred
97. STANTON & SCHWARTz, THE MENTAL HOSPITAL 98 (1954).
98. See text at notes 30, 31 supra.
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in family interrelationships."
The omission of more remote relatives from the scope of legal lia-
bility ought not, however, to suggest that voluntary contributions should
not be sought from them. When those legally liable are unable to pay,
the reimbursement agency should provide routine procedures to encourage
and facilitate voluntary contributions by brothers and sisters, grand-
parents, and any other relatives or friends who may have the ability and
the desire to contribute in some way to the patient's support.
Clearly, the patient's liability for the costs of his care should be prior
to that of anyone else. It may also be that - reimbursement agencies
should be required to look to the estate of the spouse before seeking to
impose responsibility on parents or children. But from an administrative
standpoint, it is necessary that obligors other than the patient or his
spouse be held collectively and individually liable for support costs, so
that the reimbursement agency is free to collect the full amount due
from any one of them. Of course, it is preferable that each of these
persons bear his proportionate share of the costs according to his ability
to pay; and, if for no other reason than the preservation of family har-
mony, the agency should attempt to make arrangements for collection on
this basis. But if, for example, one of the joint obligors is able to pay
the entire obligation and is within the state, while the other both refuses
to pay his proportionate share and lives beyond the reach of state process,
the agency should not be put to the necessity of entering another state's
courts in order to collect the full amount. 100
2. How much shoudd responsible persons pay? At the very heart
of a reimbursement program lies the method of formulating the amount
to be charged responsible persons. The unsatisfactory status of most
present-day state programs is the direct result of a failure to develop
statutory charges in line with some consistent, informed policy of private
responsibility.
a. Maximum liability. No compelling reason appears why the
starting point for setting the amount of private responsibility should not
be the actual cost to the state of caring for the individual patient rather
than the average per capita rate. Indeed, to the degree that any scheme
99. Cf. Jones, The Problem of Family Support, 38 N.C.L. REv. 1, 24 (1959);
Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under the American Poor Laws, 54 MicH. L. REV.
497, 508 (1956).
100. The UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT provides a com-
paratively simple means for enforcement of support obligations against non-residents
and it should be utilized whenever possible. Nevertheless, out-of-state enforcement of
support obligations should be left to the agency's discretion, and it should not be required
to undertake such action even though it cannot secure full reimbursement from a liable
person within the home state.
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departs from this approach, it deviates from what has always been con-
sidered an underlying principle of private responsibility programs,
namely, reimbursement. A public mental hospital is not like a general
charity hospital, which admits only a very limited segment of the popu-
lation at the lowest income levels. To the contrary, state mental hospi-
tals serve persons from almost all economic groups"' and in this respect
are more like private general hospitals. If a patient in a public mental
hospital or his family can afford to pay the full costs of his care, it is
anomalous that they should instead be charged a lesser amount based on
the average cost of caring for all patients in that hospital or in state
mental institutions generally.
The most obvious method of determining the cost of individual care
would be for the mental institution to adopt a system of per-patient ac-
counting like that used in most general hospitals. A basic charge would
be made for routine items, such as room, board and customary nursing
care, and a surcharge would be added for any special care. This system
would require some categorization of non-routine services, and a cost-
analysis of each service to reflect the time spent by professional staff
members, maintenance costs of special facilities, use of special drugs,
and any other expense directly related to the service.
An alternative method, involving somewhat less bookkeeping, would
be to classify patients within an institution according to the type of treat-
101. Persons at the very top of the socio-economic class structure are a possible
exception to this generalization. In connection with their study of the relationship
between class status and mental illness Hollingshead and Redlich divided the laboratory
community (New Haven, Connecticut) into five socio-economic classes, class I being
the highest and V the lowest. They found some differences in the way a state mental
hospital was used by each class:
In classes II and III, the patients are sent to the state hospitals as a "last
resort," and usually only after their families have exhausted their resources in
private facilities. Class IV uses the state hospital as a treatment center as well
as a place for custodial care. The state hospital is the one psychiatric facility
available to class V persons who become so disturbed that they have to be
separated from the community. Ordinarily, these persons are not wanted by
their families, and they are viewed as useless, obnoxious, and occasionally
dangerous to society, if not to themselves. The sequel to rejection by the family
and isolation from the community is long-range custodial care.
HOLLINGSHEAD & REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 330-31 (1958).
They point out that "although the state hospital is a minimum cost institution on
a per diem basis, it is a maximum cost institution in the long run because it functions
in large part as a 'dumping ground' for psychotic individuals in the two lower classes.
." Ibid. It seems clear that if contemporary efforts to separate the custodial and
treatment functions of state institutions are successful, so that the state mental hospital
is no longer a "dumping ground," the use of state treatment facilities by members of the
upper socio-economic classes will increase appreciably. And even now, state hospitals
in many states serve all classes simply because sufficient private facilities are not
available. See PATIENTS IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS 1956, Part III, Private Hospitals
for the Mentally I1l, Table A, which indicates that there are only 293 known private
hospitals in the United States, accommodating around 15,000 patients.
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ment they receive and to set a separate maximum rate for each classifica-
tion. Such a system would be compatible with the goal of an actual cost
maximum, however, only if the classifications were defined so as to
minimize cost variations among patients in the same category. A group
or class rate could be established by adding to the basic charge for routine
services provided for all classes a charge based upon the average cost of
additional facilities and services offered to patients within the particular
class. When an altered prognosis brought about a change in a patient's
treatment, reclassification would follow for purposes of determining a
new maximum charge.
Although few states are apt to plan their institutional facilities
around the comparatively large number of classes that might be neces-
sary to insure cost-uniformity within categories, many states will have
one or two specialized institutions which provide roughly comparable
treatment for all their patients."0 2 In such cases, there would be no ob-
jection to setting the maximum rate for these patients at the institutional
per capita cost of operation.
b. Ability to pay. To establish full reimbursement as the measure
of the fundamental private support obligation only partially disposes of
the question of how much responsible persons should be required to pay.
It is perfectly clear that many obligors simply will be unable to reimburse
the state for full maintenance costs.' Even the most outspoken advo-
cates of the principle of private responsibility do not venture to suggest
that in these circumstances the patient should be deprived of public in-
stitutional care;... such a suggestion is neither politically nor socially ac-
ceptable. Nor can the private reimbursement obligation be viewed simply
as another debt, whose satisfaction the state should demand without re-
gard to hardship. The likely consequence of such a view would be not
to lighten the state's burden but to increase it. Moreover, this ap-
proach would effectively destroy the possibility of establishing a proper
sanatory relationship among the patient, family and hospital. For fam-
ilies of limited financial resources, the ability to pay formula should con-
tinue to operate as the practical determinant of the amount of liability.
Among the several problems which attend formulation of an ability-
to-pay standard is the question of statutory definition. When inadequate
102. This might be true, for example, in a state which maintained a separate
custodial institution.
103. See note 39, supra.
104. The statutes of a few states provide, however, that the failure of those
responsible for costs-either relatives or the county-to pay support installments as
they become due is grounds for expelling the patient from the institution. E.g., Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 31.050(1) (Supp. 1960) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-631 (1955).
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criteria guide determinations of private responsibility, uniformity of ap-
plication usually suffers, and the reimbursement system loses public con-
fidence and respect. On the other hand, the rigidity which results from
too detailed specification presents at least as great a danger as the dis-
uniformity stemming from oversimplification. Therefore, although the
statutory formulation of the ability-to-pay standard may, and perhaps
should, detail to some degree the factors to be considered in making
ability-to-pay determinations, it should not circumscribe agency discre-
tion in weighing these various factors, nor should it exclude consideration
of other factors. The desired balance could best be achieved by leaving
the detailed mechanics of ability-to-pay determinations to the reimburse-
ment agency under a general rule-making power.
Among the relevant considerations toward which the statute might
direct the reimbursement agency's attention are not only the contributor's
income, but also the number of the contributor's dependents; reasonable
living expenses; job expenses; taxes; previously incurred liabilities; edu-
cational expenses; medical expenses; and the contributor's age. In ad-
dition to these factors which would affect the contributor's ability to pay
out of current income, the statute should also direct consideration of the
value of the contributor's assets.
Even with intelligible statutory guidelines, translating these abstrac-
tions into a dollars and cents determination of ability to pay is a most
difficult task. From the standpoint of administrative convenience, the
simplest approach is probably to set up a table similar to that provided
for computing federal incomes taxes, the basic support charge thus de-
pending upon the liable person's income and number of dependents. While
the task of establishing such a table appears deceptively simple, its prepara-
tion must be preceded by the gathering and interpretation of considerable
data concerning the cost of living of family units of various sizes. More-
over, since current income is not the sole indicator of ability to pay, pro-
vision must be made for appropriate adjustments in the indicated assess-
ment to account for other relevant factors. 10 5
105. Illinois Department of Public Welfare Mental Health Regulations Nos. 53 and
54, set out in part below, indicate some of the difficulties encountered in promulgating
regulations which provide explicit guidelines for determining ability to pay without unduly
restricting the administrator's discretion when unusual circumstances are involved.
Although the basic procedure for determining the amount of the assessment outlined by
these regulations approximates that suggested in the text, it should be noted that the
maximum contribution contemplated by these regulations is set at an arbitrary level
rather than at a true actual cost. The schedule of charges, omitted below, establishes a
$3 monthly contribution for a family of two persons, excluding the patient, with a gross
monthly income between $310-$319. For each $10 increase in the gross monthly income
above this amount, the monthly contribution is increased by $3, up to the maximum
monthly assessment of $81 at an income above $520 per month. For each additional de-
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Ideally, the weight to be given these factors should be dictated by a
consideration of the reasonable economic expectations of the family. For
example, a liable person might claim a reduction in his indicated assess-
ment because his business required tlat he acquire and maintain a re-
liable motor vehicle, and he was presently making payments on such a
vehicle, which investigation disclosed to be a $6,000 automobile. As-
pendent an additional $50 is allowed before the cnarges are assessed. For example, a
family of three is not required to make a contribution until its monthly income reaches
$360.
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS FOR ABILITY AND LIABILITY
REGULATION No. 53: TO PAY MAINTENANCE CHARGES
Determination of the ability and the amount of the liability of the spouse,
parents, or children to pay for the costs of the care, treatment, detention, and
training of a patient in a state hospital shall be made in accordance with the
schedule of gross monthly income and number of dependents set forth in this
regulation. Monthly income" shall be defined to include the income of the
responsible relative and his family unit. Dependent persons shall be those
persons legally dependent upon the liable relative for more than one half of their
support.
Voluntary payments will be accepted from persons whose incomec are below
the minimum base amounts shown on this schedule. Voluntary payments in
excess of required amounts will be accepted from liable persons as well as
from non-liable persons.
In those cases in which a liable relative is not able to pay all of the costs
of care and treatment on the basis of current income but has real and/or personal
property having a current market value in excess of $10,000, the amount of
such property over $10,000, in conjunction with income in excess of that amount
needed to maintain a reasonable standard of living for the liable relative for the
remainder of his life and for his dependents for the anticipated periods of their
dependency, may be used as a measure of the ability to pay. A reasonable
standard of living shall be considered to be equal to the monthly amount of
income set forth in the gross income schedule before charges are made for the
costs of maintenance on the basis of current income. The total amount of capital
to provide a reasonable standard of living shall be computed by multiplying the
anticipated number of years of life expectancy of the liable relative according to
the most recent table of ordinary life expectancy of the National Office of Vital
Statistics and the anticipated number of years of dependency of dependents, if
any, by the amount needed to provide the indicated standard of living for a
one-year period less the regular income which can be expected from other
sources.
The income and assets of a patient shall not be subject to charges for
the costs of care and treatment until the needs of his dependents for a reasonable
standard of living are provided. If the current income of the patient, or his
estate, is sufficient to provide a reasonable standard of living in accordance with
the gross income schedule set forth herein, any remaining income and assets may
be assessed for the costs of care and treatment. If current income is inadequate
to provide a reasonable standard of living for the dependents for their antici-
pated periods of dependency, the amount of the assets necessary to provide such
a standard of living for that period of dependency shall not be considered
assessable for the payment of maintenance charges. The total amount needed
to provide a reasonable standard of living shall be computed by multiplying the
anticipated number of years of a dependency by the amount needed to provide
such reasonable standard of living for a one-year period less the amount of
annual income of the patient and his dependents. For these purposes a reason-
able standard of living shall be considered to be equal to the monthly amounts
of gross income set forth in the schedule included herein.
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suming that the claim for a reduction has some merit, the reimbursement
agency might determine that a person in his circumstances and income
class could reasonably expect to purchase and maintain a vehicle costing
only $2,500. On this basis the agency would allow a proportionate re-
duction in the assessment based not upon the liable person's actual ex-
penditures for the acquisition and maintenance of the car, but upon that
part of these expenditures justified by reasonable economic expectations.
Of course "reasonable economic expectations" is almost as slippery
a concept as "ability to pay"; and many of the questions which arise will
be much more perplexing than the example. As a guide to the adminis-
trator's exercise of discretion, however, the criterion of reasonable eco-
nomic expectations is far more explicit than any general exhortation
simply to "consider" various factors.
The "economic expectation" approach to determination of ability to
pay would eliminate the necessity for limitations on the duration of lia-
bility. Such limitations have stemmed from a feeling that a long-
continued support burden too often results in hardship on other members
MENTAL HEALTH
REGULATION No. 54:
ALLOWANCES FOR UNUSUAL EXPENSES OR
CIRCUMSTANCES IN DETERMINING ABILITY
TO PAY MAINTENANCE CHARGES
If examination reveals unusual expenses or other circumstances which
indicate that gross income is not an adequate measure of ability to pay mainten-
ances charges for a patient in a state hospital, allowances for the unusual
expenses and circumstances listed below shall be made by decreasing the gross
income and by using the resultant amount as income in applying the schedule
for the purpose of determining the monthly charge.
Proof of payment of the unusual expenses, or proof of circumstances, must
be furnished upon request.
1. Expense of medical and related costs in excess of 4% of the gross income.
2. Expense of maintaining dependents outside the home in excess of $50 per
month per dependent.
3. Expense of contributing toward support of relatives other than dependents
outside the home.
4. Expense of housekeeper or baby sitter when the spouse is the patient.
5. Expense of cleaning and laundry when the spouse is the patient.
6. Expense of education of dependents in excess of $50 per month per de-
pendent.
7. Expense of educational courses for employed liable relative.
8. Expense of travel of the liable relative only when required for the job and
if not reimbursed by the employer.
9. Expense of rent of liable relative in excess of 25% of gross income.
10. Expense of maintaining two homes when liable relative's family cannot be
moved to place of employment.
11. Expense of alimony or court ordered support paid by the liable relative.
12. One additional dependency when liable relative is blind.
13. One additional dependency when liable relative is 65 years of age or over.
14. One additional dependency for the liable relative when more than one-half
of the patient's support is provided by the liable outside the hospital during
period of assessment of charges.
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of the family. If, however, ability to pay were determined in accordance
with the family's reasonable economic expectations, the obligation of sup-
port would moderate at just those times when funds were needed for
other legitimate purposes. As parents grew older, for example, their
reasonable need to provide for retirement would decrease their obligation
to pay for an institutionalized dependent. Similarly, normal children ap-
proaching college age would furnish the occasion for a reduction of the
family support burden provided, of course, the family could realistically
expect to contribute toward the expenses of higher education.
This approach would also obviate any need for providing for a
cushion of assets in some arbitrary amount against the patient's eventual
release, since the computation of ability to pay would take into account
the possibility that the family would have to support the patient at home
during his convalescence and the obligors would be permitted to accumu-
late or preserve a fund for that purpose.
C. The Implementation of Policy
Clearly, it is both impossible and undesirable to eliminate the judg-
ment of the administrator in the process of determining liability. Never-
theless, if a state is to achieve a unified approach to the question of pri-
vate responsibility, it must provide an effective method of disseminating
uniform procedures and policies to these administrators and of con-
trolling their individual efforts to apply them. The advantages of a
centralized administration for this purpose far outweigh any of the pos-
sible or putative merits of a locally or institutionally controlled reimburse-
ment effort.
It is said that a system of local responsibility, under which a local
court and local welfare agencies cooperate in determining and enforcing
private responsibility, places reimbursement in the hands of those whose
understanding and appreciation of the problems of persons in their
community is much greater than that of "outsiders." This localization,
the argument goes, simplifies the process of investigation and provides
persons responsible for support costs with a convenient and familiar
forum for determinations of their ability to pay. No fundamental in-
consistency exists, however, between the concept of centralized admin-
istration and some degree of localization in providing facilities and per-
sonnel for determinations and enforcement of the support obligation. A
successful central reimbursement agency, in any but the smallest states,
would of necessity have to provide for some kind of local administrative
contact.
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The critical difference between existing systems of local control
over reimbursement and a centralized system is that local control suffers
from an absence of effective coordination in both policy and procedure.
Inevitably, the fact that each community court must independently de-
velop its means test criteria leads to disuniformity throughout a state
Some judges are strict, others lenient. The amount that a family is
required to contribute more often depends upon the accident of residence
than upon any state-wide policy of private responsibility. Furthermore,
to place the final responsibility for administration of the means test with
locally elected or appointed officials is not only to leave uncontrolled the
variations arising from the diverse temperaments of different judges but
also to invite actual manipulation as a means of currying political favor.
It is extremely difficult, as a practical matter, to detect an understatement
or omission of assets or income in a report on financial status; and the
pressures on government officials in this area are as significant as they
are in other areas which intimately involve the monetary interests of pri-
vate citizens.
Besides presenting problems of uniformity and control, local organi-
zation lacks the breadth of operation and the flexibility necessary to
achieve an effective reimbursement program. The mobility of present-
day state populations, coupled with the limited resources of independent,
local systems, make it extremely unlikely that a county court or its desig-
nated investigative agent can make a thorough canvass of a family's fi-
nancial situation or, indeed, even succeed in locating all persons statutorily
liable. On the other hand, a central agency with the sole and continuing
responsibility for administering a reimbursement program can develop
techniques of routine investigation and verification and achieve a state
and even interstate co-ordination that will make its operations much
more efficient and more thorough than those of an independent local
agency.
Since an institutionally administered reimbursement system must
often rely upon local officials for information and enforcement activities,
its deficiencies are in many respects similar to those of a local system.
The chief claim of merit of the institutional system is that it allows the
institution to consider the effect of the support burden on the relationship
among the patient, his family, and the hospital. This is not an unmixed
blessing, however, since it has been noted that a close connection between
the financial and psychiatric elements of administration within a hospital
has occasionally fostered a staff attitude toward patients' relatives "strik-
ingly like traditional attitudes toward a patron: ambivalence and out-
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right antagonism."1 6 Moreover, because the business manager of a men-
tal institution usually has neither the time nor the training to weigh the
complex factors of an adequate means test, the potential advantage dis-
appears in a mechanical application of insufficient criteria. Enforcement,
too, is ordinarily compromised under an institutional system. The
needed persistence for the collection of difficult claims is usually lacking,
not only because other immediate administrative tasks seem more im-
portant, but also because motivation is lacking: in most states the funds
which may be collected do not accrue to the direct benefit of the institu-
tion. A central agency whose specialized and immediate concern is re-
imbursement alone can be far more effective than an institutional divi-
sion of collections.
While a centralized reimbursement program offers the advantages
of co-ordinated policy, adequate investigation, a uniform collection effort,
and freedom from local political pressures, centralization alone is not
sufficient. The primary goal of institutionalization for mental illness is
to effect the patient's recovery. Administration of the reimbursement
program must be harmonized with this therapeutic end. The needed
liason between state medical officers and personnel charged with the
revenue aspects of the state mental health program is made difficult, if
not impossible, when the reimbursement agency is administratively sepa-
rate from the state's over-all program of mental health care. For this
reason, the central reimbursement agency should be comprehended with-
in that state department which is also responsible for the institutional
care for which support charges are assessed.
The agency should be made responsible not only for the determina-
tion of private responsibility, but also for the process of billing and col-
lections. Such a system would free institutional administrators to con-
centrate on other tasks.
The central reimbursement agency should be vested with adequate
rule-making power and sufficient powers of general investigation so that
the ability-to-pay criteria which it formulates will be based upon con-
crete information furnishing a sound basis for judgment. The agency
should be authorized to enter into voluntary contractual arrangements for
payment for the costs of care. Its contested determinations, like those of
most other administrative agencies, should be subject to limited judicial
review confined to an examination of the agency's exercise of discretion.
To aid in its enforcement activities, a legal staff should be provided
for the agency, authorized not only to advise but also to prosecute col-
106. STANTON & SCHWARTZ, THE MENTAL HOSPITAL 98 (1954).
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lection actions on its behalf. This staff would minimize the agency's
dependence upon local officials and insure the elimination of local fa-
voritism or bias. It would also be well situated to utilize reciprocal state
laws for the enforcement of support and, conversely, to handle out-of-
state requests for enforcement of institutional support obligations against
state residents. In light of the presumptive correctness of the agency's
determination and to avoid delays, it might be desirable to provide sum-
mary court procedures for agency enforcement of actions for support.
In short, the centralized reimbursement agency would be fully ef-
fective only if given broad powers and wide discretion, with the freedom
to shape its special operation within the broad confines of legislative
policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The improvement of existing state procedures for the determina-
tion and enforcement of private responsibility is only a fragment of the
larger program of providing the best possible care for the mentally ill.
By themselves, any changes in state reimbursement programs will have
only the most indirect effect upon such other problems as inadequacy of
facilities, of treatment, and of staff. Furthermore, the practical prob-
lems involved in a major revision of a state reimbursement program
should not be underestimated.
Nevertheless, it is clear that many of the problems of mental health
care stem from a single source: a prevailing public attitude toward men-
tal illness combining apathy, hopelessness and shame. There is no magic
formula for transforming such attitudes overnight. A number of organ-
izations, both local and national, have long labored in this subtle task. A
reimbursement program which itself views mental illness like other ill-
nesses and assesses charges on that basis is geared to and may be helpful
in fostering a more enlightened attitude toward mental illness.
Indeed, the effect of charging patients or their relatives for treat-
ment received instead of on an average per diem basis is of considerable
potential practical importance. While health insurance plans have been
expanding in the past decade, they have generally not covered treatment
for mental illness. Since mental institutions have been viewed largely as
places of custody, and health insurance is intended to be an interim bene-
fit to bring about recovery, it has not been thought appropriate to extend
insurance to cover the costs of mere custodial care. If, however, mental
institutions fulfill their obligation of treatment, and charges are assessed
individually for that treatment, there is no logical reason why insurance
benefits could not easily be expanded. Not only would such insurance
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coverage make support contributions a much more significant source of
state revenue, but it would in turn be a factor in reshaping public attitudes.
Finally, a centrally operated reimbursement program based on actual
cost provides a sound framework for adjusting the private support obli-
gation to advancing methods of administering treatment to mental pa-
tients. Foremost on the horizon, for example, is the concept of out-
patient care-supportive treatment administered by local health agencies
and social workers after the patient has been discharged from the hospi-
tal. Such post-hospital care offers an effective and comparatively eco-
nomical method of maintaining certain types of patients in the com-
munity and curtailing the periodic readmissions which otherwise are
necessary. The cost of this supportive care given outside the hospital
could easily be integrated into the private support obligation and its re-
imbursement administered without alteration of the basic reimbursement
program.
Mental illness, we have been told, is America's number one health
problem. We cannot, therefore, afford to neglect a single possibility
which may contribute to its eventual solution. Along with other press-
ing needs in this field, the reformulation of state reimbursement pro-
grams is a necessary task for today.
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